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Constitutional Criminal Procedure
by James P. Fleissner*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the United States
Constitution are the three pillars of the American system of criminal
justice. The three amendments make procedural guarantees using
enigmatic terms that are given meaning by those with the power of
interpretation. The Fourth Amendment protects us from "unreasonable
searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment includes a guarantee of
"due process of law." The Sixth Amendment guarantees a "speedy" trial.
In the years since 1791, when these provisions were enshrined in the
Bill of Rights, the courts have played the leading role in shaping the
scope of these broad pronouncements. The evolution of these rights in
the courts has been influenced by history, tradition, and precedent as
well as changing societal attitudes about the requisites of fair process
and the best way to maintain a safe, orderly society.
An important part of this constitutional evolution is played out in the
United States Courts of Appeals, which decide a high volume of cases
arising from federal criminal prosecutions and appeals in habeas corpus
litigation concerning alleged federal constitutional violations in state
prosecutions. This Article presents the annual survey of the constitutional criminal procedure decisions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit. The author surveyed decisions from calendar
year 1996 that addressed Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment issues.
In selecting cases for inclusion in the Article, the author attempted to
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Chief of the General Crimes Section, Office of the United States Attorney, Northern
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Appeals. The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of Jennifer D. Rose,
a member of the Mercer Law School Class of 1997.
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choose cases based on their significance to practitioners, with an
emphasis on important interpretive decisions on recurring questions.
The discussion of the various cases includes a summary of the issues and
the court's reasoning, as well as some commentary and analysis. Where
appropriate, recent related developments in the United States Supreme
Court are noted.

II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.'
A.

WarrantlessSearches/ExigentCircumstances

The general rule that warrantless searches are presumptively
unreasonable is subject to several well-established exceptions.? One
such exception is that an officer may, during an investigatory Terry stop
grounded on reasonable suspicion, conduct a pat-down or frisk limited
in scope to finding weapons.' Contraband found during a protective
pat-down search is admissible. Another exception is that an officer with
probable cause to arrest a suspect may conduct a search before arresting
the suspect where "the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels" of the
search, as long as the search is "not necessary to support the probable
cause to arrest."4 Yet another exception is that searches may proceed
without warrants if there are "exigent circumstances," such as a serious
risk that evidence will be destroyed." In United States v. Banshee,' the
court addressed the issue of whether one of these exceptions justified the
challenged warrantless search.
In Banshee, Deputy Sheriff William Tbdd and another officer pulled
over a northbound vehicle in Camden County, Georgia. The stated
reason for the stop was that the vehicle was being operated with its

1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,390 (1978); United States v. McGregor, 31 F.3d
1067, 1068-69 (11th Cir. 1994).
3. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968).

4. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 n.6 (1980).
5. See United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1973).
6. 91 F.3d 99 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 752 (1997).
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high-beam lights despite the presence of on-coming traffic. The car was
being driven by Kenneth Parker and contained two female passengers,
Mary Lee Banshee and Lee Ann Johnson. Deputy Todd ordered Parker
out of the car and asked for his driver's license. Parker could not
produce a license, but claimed to have a District of Columbia license.
Parker also stated that the three were returning from a vacation in
Miami and that Banshee had rented the car. When the officer approached Banshee, who was in the passenger seat, she said that a friend
had rented the car, that the three were returning from Orlando, and
that they had not traveled farther south. Although a computer check
failed to confirm that Parker had a valid license, Deputy Todd issued a
warning, told Parker that he could no longer drive, and informed him
that he was free to go. Before Parker left, Deputy Todd asked Parker for
consent to search the vehicle, and Parker agreed
Deputy Todd frisked Parker and approached the passengers still
seated in the car. When Johnson got out of the car, Deputy Todd did not
frisk her, but asked her if she had a weapon, which she denied. Deputy
Todd then ordered Banshee out of the car." When Banshee got out,
Deputy Todd saw a bulge in Banshee's waist area. Rather than frisking
Banshee, Deputy Todd asked her if she had any weapons or "anything."
Banshee replied in the negative. When Deputy Todd asked about the
bulge, Banshee said she was pregnant. At this point, Deputy Todd made
remarks to his fellow officer expressing his belief that Banshee was
carrying contraband. After an unsuccessful attempt to radio for the
assistance of a female officer, Deputy Todd did a pat-down search of
Banshee's midsection. He then handcuffed Banshee and asked her what
she was hiding. After Banshee said it was something her boyfriend had
given her, Deputy Todd released one of Banshee's hands from the cuffs
and ordered her to remove the object from her clothes. The package
contained 728.7 grams of cocaine."

7. 91 F.3d at 100-01. Although the deputy told Parker he was free to leave before
asking for consent to search, he was not required to do so. The Supreme Court recently
rejected the contention that the Fourth Amendment requires an officer to inform a person
stopped for a traffic violation that he is free to go as a prerequisite to seeking consent to
search.: The court thus refused to find a constitutional "first tell, then ask" rule. See Ohio
v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
8. 91 F.3d at 100-01. In Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997), the Supreme Court
held that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers out of the car pending
completion of the stop. The court based its conclusion on safety concerns, d. Banshee,
decided before Wilson, does not discuss the basis for ordering the passengers out of the car,
but the officer's security during the consent search would seem to provide a basis.
9. 91 F.3d at 101.
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Banshee moved to suppress the cocaine. The district court denied the
motion, finding that the consent to search was valid and that the
detention and pat-down search of Banshee was permissible under
Terry.'0 The court of appeals focused on the Terry issues, which it
termed "problematic." The district court's conclusion that the patdown was permissible under Terry is difficult to defend. A valid
protective pat-down search must "be confined in scope to an intrusion
reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden
instruments for the assault of the police officer." 2 It is obvious that
Deputy Todd was not searching for a weapon when he patted down
Banshee. Both his words and his actions establish this. He made
remarks indicating that he thought Banshee was carrying contraband:
"She, She got it on her ... I can see it, she got it on her."" Deputy
Todd then put off a frisk and allowed Banshee to stand nearby without
handcuffs while he tried to get assistance from a female officer."'
Although Deputy Todd was worried about accusations of improper
conduct in frisking a female, he clearly was not concerned about being
harmed. He believed, quite correctly, that he had found drugs. Thus,
it is hard to defend the pat-down under Terry.
The court of appeals upheld the denial of the suppression motion, but
chose not to adopt the district court's Terry rationale." Instead, the
court upheld the search by making two findings: First, Deputy Todd had
probable cause to conduct a search.'" Second, "[Tihere were exigent
circumstances excusing the need for a warrant." 7 In reaching these
conclusions, the court noted that it was reviewing the issues de novo, as
required by a recent Supreme Court decision setting forth the standard
of review for warrantless searches and seizures.' As for the finding

10. Id. The district court also found that the traffic stop was not pretextual. Id.
Fourth Amendment challenges to stops for traffic violations on the grounds that they are
pretexts for investigating other criminal conduct are no longer viable. Whren v. United
States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
11. 91 F.3d at 101.
12. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
13. 91 F.3d at 101.
14, Id.
15. Id. at 101-02.
16. Id. at 102.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 101. See Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996). Although the
court held that ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make
warrantless searches should be reviewed de novo, the court preserved the deferential clear
error standard for the district court's findings ofhistorical fact. Id. at 1659. Thus, the new
standard of review does not eliminate the often difficult problem of sorting factual from
legal findings concerning the fluid concepts of reasonable suspicion and probable cause.
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that Deputy Todd had probable cause to believe that the search would
uncover evidence of crime, one can consider that Parker and Banshee
had made conflicting statements about their trip and that there was a
visible bulge in Banshee's midsection. But can the arguably improper
pat-down be considered? And what of Banshee's post pat-down
statement about receiving the package from a friend? The court simply
said it was basing its finding on the inconsistent statements and the
bulge in Banshee's midsection."'
It is the court's finding of exigent circumstances, however, that is open
to serious question. There was no reason to believe that evidence would
be lost or destroyed. The court explained its finding: "Specifically,
Deputy Todd had the option of either letting Banshee go or detaining her
for a prolonged period of time while he secured a warrant. Accordingly,
under the circumstances, the frisk was much less an intrusion than a
prolonged detention."0 First of all, if Deputy Todd had probable cause
to believe Banshee was carrying contraband, did he not also have the
option of arresting Banshee? Furthermore, the court's analysis seems
to allow the exigent circumstances exception to drain the vitality out of
the presumption favoring warrants. In a traffic stop, it always will be
the case that doing a warrantless search will be less intrusive and time
consuming than obtaining a warrant. If those facts alone give rise to a
finding of exigent circumstances, then exigent comes to mean "commonplace."
The court of appeals advanced an alternative ground for approving the
21
search, finding that the search was incident to a lawful arrest.
Having raised the possibility that Deputy Todd might have had to let
Banshee go, the court found probable cause to arrest.22 The court
stated that "because there was probable cause for the arrest before the
search and the arrest immediately followed the challenged search, the
fact that Banshee was not under arrest at the time of the search does
not render the search incident to the arrest doctrine inapplicable."28
However, the doctrine invoked by the court requires that the fruits of the
search are "not necessary to support probable cause to arrest."' Did
Deputy Todd really have probable cause to arrest before he patted down
Banshee? It does not appear that Deputy Todd or the district court

19.

91 F.3d at 102.

20. Id.
21. Id
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980); United States v.
Thornton, 733 F.2d 121, 127-28 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
24. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111 n.6.
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thought so.5 It is true that the presence of a bulge has contributed to
probable cause findings in other cases, 26 but the court of appeals
conclusion is surprising, especially in a case the district court analyzed
as a Terry stop.
The decision in Banshee must be understood in light of one other
aspect of the case: Deputy Todd's stop of the car in which Banshee was
2
The court commended the use of
riding was recorded on videotapeY.
the tape, which obviously serves to give the court an accurate picture of
the traffic stop.s Ordinarily, frisking passengers who have bulges in
their clothing would be upheld as a protective Terry pat-down. In fact,
the district court upheld the search of Banshee on that basis. However,
the videotape made it clear to the court of appeals that the actions of
Deputy Todd were not based on security concerns. The court heard the
deputy's own words and saw his actions. The videotape made it
impossible for the officers to interpret the search as a protective patdown. Whatever the merits of the decision in Banshee, it is clear that
the videotaping of traffic stops and other searches adds a new dimension
to the litigation of Fourth Amendment issues: the court is not at risk of
relying on testimony affected by poor memory, selective recall, or selfserving recreation of events.
Another case involving the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement is United States u. Mikell." That case involved
a narcotics investigation that began in typical fashion: law enforcement
officers in Florida received an anonymous tip that Mikell, Young, and
several others were dealing crack in Sarasota. That tip was followed by
a second anonymous tip that Mikell, Young, and Jackson would be
buying five thousand dollars. worth of powder cocaine and converting it
into crack that evening. The second tip said the five thousand dollars
was in the bedroom of Young's mother and that the three men, using

25. The district court found that after Banshee placed the package on the hood of the
car, there was probable cause to arrest, and that this justified the opening of the package.
91 F.3d at 101. As summarized by the court of appeals, the district court's findings treated
the encounter as an investigatory Terry stop up to that point. Id.
26. The court in Banshee cited two such cases. Id. at 102. See United States v.
Tomaszewski, 833 F.2d 1532, 1535 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Elsoffer, 671 F.2d
1294, 1299 (11th Cir. 1982). Of course, both cases involved a unique set of facts. For
example, the court in Elsoffer emphasized the odd size and shape of the bulge, which was
the size of"a good sized soft bound book." 671 F.2d at 1295, 1299. The court stated, "We
do not hold that any bulge would give probable cause for an arrest." Id. at 1299 n.10.
27. 91 F.3d at 100 n.1.
28. Id.
29. 102 F.3d 470 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1459 (1997).
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Young's car, would be taking the cocaine to an apartment where it would

be converted into crack. 80
The police staked out the apartment on the evening of the day they
received the second tip. A Thunderbird pulled up and two persons, one
of whom had a duffle bag, got out. A third person met the two who
arrived in the car, and all three entered the apartment identified in the
tip. After twenty minutes, a person left the apartment and walked
away; a few moments later, a person later identified as Langston left the
apartment in the Thunderbird and drove to a grocery store where he
purchased a large box of baking soda, a substance used in making crack.
Langston returned to the apartment, and about an hour later, three
men, one carrying the duffle bag, were seen leaving the apartment. The
three men drove away in the Thunderbird. Officers said they believed
that a fourth person remained in the apartment. 1
The police pursued the Thunderbird and attempted to pull it over. A
chase ensued, during which the police saw plastic bags being thrown
from the Thunderbird and one of the passengers talking on a cellular
phone. The bags were recovered-they contained powder cocaine;
chunks of crack also were found on the road. The Thunderbird,
containing Young, Mikell, Langston, and Jackson, was stopped after it
rammed a patrol car. Young was still talking on the phone. The car
contained drug residue and other evidence.3 2
Two of the officers returned to the apartment. They said a superior
told them to conduct a "security sweep" to assure that evidence in the
The superior, however, recalled it
apartment was not destroyed.'
differently: he said he told the officers to "secure" the apartment while
a search warrant was obtained." After arriving at the apartment, the
officers heard "a clanging noise within the apartment and forced the
door open." 5 In the search, during which the officers claimed they
searched only areas that could conceal a person, they discovered that the
noise they heard was coming from an air conditioner. The officers also
found a wealth of evidence, including drugs and drug paraphernalia.
The police later obtained a search warrant based on the information at
the observations of the officers during the
their disposal, including
36
protective sweep.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

102 F.3d at 472.
Id. at 472-73.
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 473-74.
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The stop of the Thunderbird clearly was justified under Terry. 7 The
court of appeals had no difficulty reaching that result. The court then
addressed the warrantless entry of the apartment.s" Although the
warrantless search of a home is presumptively unreasonable, such a
search is allowed if both probable cause and exigent circumstances
exist."9 The court concluded that based on the totality of circumstances, there was a fair probability that evidence of crime would be found in
the apartment.'4 Given all the evidence obtained before and after the
stop of the Thunderbird, the court's conclusion is sound.
With respect to the issue of exigent circumstances, the court noted
that whether the authorities have reason to believe that evidence might
be destroyed is judged under an objective test: "Itihe appropriate inquiry
is whether the facts would lead a reasonable and experienced police
officer to believe that evidence might be destroyed or removed before a
warrant could be secured." 1 The court of appeals did not mention the
Supreme Court decision months earlier that announced that the validity
of warrantless searches should be reviewed de novo. 42 However, the
test set forth by the court, which defers on fact finding and reviews the
application of law to facts de novo, is not significantly different.'
In ruling on the presence of exigent circumstances, there were some
troubling facts. The discrepancy between the stories of the officers who
entered the apartment and their superior gives one pause. The officers
remembered being told to do a "security sweep"; the superior said he told
them to secure the apartment. Officers doing surveillance at the
apartment as the men got into the Thunderbird said three men got into
the car and one man was believed to be in the apartment. However, four
men were in the car when it was stopped. The clanging sound that led
the officers to break into the apartment turned out to be an air
conditioner. It also turned out that no one was in the apartment.
Despite these aspects of the record, the court examined the officers'
determination of exigent circumstances based on the information they
had at the time. The officers believed that someone remained in the
apartment. They also knew that Young was using a cellular phone; he
could have been calling a confederate at the apartment. The court
stated that the discovery of powder cocaine during the traffic stop may

37.

Id. at 475.

38. Id.
39. Id. (citing United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991)).
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing United States v. Young, 909 F.2d 442, 446 (11th Cir. 1990)).
42. Id. at 474 (setting forth standard of review). See Ornelas v. United States, 116 S.
Ct. 1657 (1996), discussed at supra note 18.
43. 102 F.3d at 474 (citing United States v. Hromada, 49 F.3d 685 (11th Cir. 1995)).
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have led to the inference that the crack was left at the apartment."
The court concluded that the facts confronting the officers at the time
could have led a reasonable, experienced officer to believe that evidence
might be lost.45 The key fact was Young's use of the phone. In the
absence of that fact, there would be little reason to believe that a person
remaining in the apartment would know about the stop of the vehicle
and begin destroying evidence.
B.

WarrantlessArrest/Search Incident to Arrest

In United States v. Gonzalez,' defendant appealed from his convictions for two counts of making false statements to a firearms dealer and
two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The charges were
based on defendant's purchase and possession of two guns: a .38 Smith
& Wesson seized from defendant's car at the time of his arrest and a
9mm. Beretta seized from a residence where the defendant had lived.47
The defendant unsuccessfully challenged the seizure of both guns. This
section will discuss the seizure of the .38 Smith & Wesson in the search
incident to defendant's arrest. The following section will discuss the
seizure of the 9mm. Beretta, which was found during a consent search.
Augustin Gonzalez was convicted of violating the federal drug laws in
1984 and sentenced to thirteen years imprisonment. In 1989 he was
paroled." In 1991 the United States Parole Commission found that
Gonzalez had violated the terms of his parole and issued a warrant for
the "retaking" of Gonzalez. The authorities were unable to locate
Gonzalez until 1992, when they received information that Gonzalez was
living in Miami Lakes, Florida, had been seen driving a black Buick
Grand National, and had been seen with a firearm. Deputy Marshal
Tom Figmik and Special Agent George Mastin of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms went looking for Gonzalez. 49
When the two officers arrived in Miami Lakes, they spotted a black
Buick Grand National near the place Gonzalez reportedly lived. After

44. Id. at 476.
45. Id.
46. 71 F.3d 819 (11th Cir. 1996).
47. Id. at 824.
48. Id. at 821. The rules and apparatus for administering the federal parole system
exist to administer convictions obtained under the law as it existed before the adoption of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines in 1987. The Sentencing Guidelines do not
include a parole system.
49. Id.
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following the car a short time, the officers turned on the siren and blue
light and attempted to stop the car. When Gonzalez refused to stop, the
officers pulled up next to the driver's side of the Grand National and one
of the officers displayed his badge and ordered Gonzalez to stop.
Gonzalez put his car into reverse and attempted to evade the officers.
The officers gave chase. Eventually the two cars collided and Gonzalez
was arrested." The officers then searched the Grand National and
found a black leather case containing the .38 Smith & Wesson revolver
in the glove compartment.51
On appeal, Gonzalez raised several issues. First, he challenged the
validity of the warrant issued by the United States Parole Commission,
arguing that the Commission, a creature of the executive branch, is not
a neutral and detached magistrate under the Fourth Amendment.52
Despite some authority contrary to defendant's position," the court of
appeals found it unnecessary to address defendant's attack on the
warrant." Rather, the court analyzed the arrest of Gonzalez as a
warrantless arrest based on his commission of crimes when he attempted
to evade the officers."" The court stated that even if the officers lacked
probable cause to arrest, "the resulting arrest of appellant was nevertheless rendered lawful by appellant's subsequent conduct."" Specifically,
the court found that the actions of Gonzalez gave the officers authority
to arrest him for assaulting a federal officer or otherwise disobeying a
lawful order, resisting arrest,"7 and impeding the officers in their
attempt to serve legal process." For these crimes, committed in the
presence of the officers, Gonzalez was subject to a warrantless arrest.59
Because these crimes "served as an independent and valid basis" for

50. Id. Gonzalez was initially charged with assault on the officers based on the theory
that he rammed the officers. See 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1994). At the suppression hearing, the
officers testified that Gonzalez rammed their car. The defense contended that the officers
rammed the Grand National. 71 F.3d at 822 n.4. There apparently was testimony from
an expert transportation consulting engineer that called the officer's version of the crash
into question. The government later moved to dismiss the assault charge. Id. at 830 n.23.
51. 71 F.3d at 833.
52. Id. at 826.
53. See id. at 827 n.16.
54, Id. at 826.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 111(aX1). Gonzalez denied assaulting the officers by ramming
them with his car, but the court noted that he clearly violated the other proscriptions of
section Ill (aXl). See id. at 827 n.17.
58. 71 F.3d at 826. See 18 U.S.C. § 1501 (1994).
59. Id. at 826-27 (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); United States
v. Costa, 691 F.2d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 1982)).
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probable cause supporting the warrantless arrest, the officers' subsequent search of the car's glove compartment was a valid search incident
to arrest.' The court of appeals applied the rule established by the
Supreme Court in New York v. Belton,6 ' which states that when *an
occupant of a vehicle is arrested, the search incident to arrest may
include the search of closed containers found in the passenger area of
the vehicle.62
C.

Consent Searches

The court of appeals faced another issue in the Gonzalez case: Was
the officers' subsequent warrantless search of Gonzalez's residence a
The facts are troubling. After arresting
valid consent search?'
Gonzalez, Deputy Marshal Figmik, accompanied by Deputy Marshal Tom
McDermott and several other marshals, went to the Miami Lakes
residence used by Gonzalez. They saw Raquel Fernandez, whom they
believed was Gonzalez's girlfriend, exit the residence and drive away.
Figmik followed her, pulled her over, ordered her out of the car, and
detained her. At the time of the stop and detention, Figmik had no basis
to suspect Raquel Fernandez had committed a crime. Figmik tried to
get Raquel Fernandez to consent to a search of the residence, but she
refused, saying that the residence was owned by Maria Fernandez, her
mother. Raquel Fernandez asked to be allowed to return to her car, but
Figmik refused, telling her to walk back to the residence."
Back at the residence, Figmik asked Raquel Fernandez about her
relationship with Gonzalez. She admitted knowing him, denied that he
lived at the residence, and said she had not seen him for months.
Figmik then took out an automatic garage door opener he had seized
from Gonzalez's car and used it to open the garage door of the residence.
Raquel Fernandez used her own garage door opener to close the door,
and Figmik responded by opening it again. Figmik continued to seek
Raquel Fernandez's consent to search, but she was steadfast in her
refusal. She did, however, agree to call her mother, Maria."
When Maria Fernandez arrived at the residence, the marshals asked
for her consent to search. She refused. At the suppression hearing,

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 825-27.
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
Id. at 460.
71 F.3d at 827.
Id at 823.
Id.
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Maria Fernandez testified that the marshals told her that her daughter
would go to jail for five years if she continued to refuse. Maria
Fernandez eventually said she was going to go inside for a drink of
water. When she did, Deputy Marshal McDermott, without her
permission, followed her into the house, stating that she could not go in
alone. McDermott continued to ask for consent to search Gonzalez's
room. Maria Fernandez finally relented and later signed a consent-tosearch form. In the warrantless search, the officers found the 9mm.
Beretta and the fraudulent forms completed during the purchase of the
two weapons involved in the case."
The consent of Maria Fernandez was the only legal justification for the
warrantless search. The court began its analysis by noting that there
was no question that Maria Fernandez had the authority to consent to
The issue was whether the consent of
the search of the residence.'
The court focused its
Maria Fernandez was voluntarily given."
attention on events following the arrival of Maria Fernandez, because
she gave the consent to search. 9 The court expressed its concern over
the improper and unlawful conduct of the marshals in seeking consent
from Raquel Fernandez, but found that those acts did not affect Maria
Fernandez's eventual consent." With its attention thus focused on
Maria Fernandez, the court noted that "the absence of official coercion
is a sine qua non of effective consent."71 Viewing the record in the light
most favorable to the government, the court concluded that the district
court's factual finding that Maria Fernandez voluntarily consented to the
search was not clearly erroneous.7"
In reaching its holding, the court of appeals relied heavily on the
credibility determinations of the district court. For example, the district
court found that the testimony of the officers was credible while the
testimony of Maria Fernandez was not.7 The district court obviously
discounted the claim of Maria Fernandez that the officers threatened to
send her daughter to jail. Confronted with two "'wildly differing accounts'" of what happened, the district court credited the testimony of
the law enforcement officers. 4 The district court's reconstruction of

66. Id. at 823-24.
67. Id. at 827.

68. Id. at 828. The court of appeals deemed the issue of standing waived and proceeded
to reach the merits. Id. at 828 nn. 18, 19.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 828.
at 828 n.20.
at 828.
at 829.
at 831.
at 830-31.
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events put special emphasis on the fact that Maria Fernandez agreed to
the search after receiving an assurance that the search would be limited
to Gonzalez's possessions." The district court found that this assur6
ance was the turning point that led to a voluntary consent to search.'
The difficult issue for the court of appeals was how the conduct of
Deputy Marshal McDermott, who followed Maria Fernandez into the
house uninvited, should affect the analysis of consent. 77 The court
clearly was displeased with the officer's conduct."8 It characterized9
McDermott's warrantless entry as a "Fourth Amendment violation."7
The court pointedly rejected the government's claim that the failure of
Maria Fernandez to bar the officer constituted implied consent to his
entry's The court quoted a prior opinion: "[Tihe government may not
show consent to enter from the defendant's failure to object to the entry.
To do so would be to justify entry by consent and consent by entry."1
Despite these statements, the court of appeals concluded that McDermott's warrantless entry did not vitiate the voluntariness of Maria
Fernandez's consent, noting that her testimony at the suppression
hearing did not claim that the illegal entry caused her consent.8 2

III. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.8

75. Id. at 831.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id
Id. at 829.
Id.
Id at 829 n.21.
Id. at 829-30.
Id. at 830 (quoting United States v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423, 1427-28 (9th Cir. 1990)).
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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The Right Against Self-Incrimination

Once an arrestee has been informed of his Miranda rights," police
must stop the interrogation if the arrestee states that he wishes to
remain silent 8 or requests an attorney.86 In United States v. Mikell,"7 the court of appeals confronted the issue of whether a vague or
equivocal invocation of Miranda rights requires that the police cease
interrogating an arrestee. In Mikell, after defendant was arrested and
informed of his rights, he indicated a willingness to talk with investigators." The advice of rights given Mikell included telling him that he
could end the interview at any time and that he could choose not to
answer particular questions.8 9 After some preliminary questioning, the
investigators confronted Mikell with evidence they had discovered.90
Several times during the interview, Mikell declined to answer particular
questions by simply remaining mute or shaking his head, but never
asked for the questioning to stop and never requested an attorney. 1
Mikell did, however, answer other questions, and in doing so made a
number of damaging admissions.'
In a prior decision, the court of appeals held that when an arrestee
makes an equivocal request for an attorney or an equivocal request to
end the questioning, investigators must limit the scope of the interrogation to clarifying the equivocal request." However, that was before the
Supreme Court decision in Davis v. United States," in which the Court
held that the arrestee must clearly articulate a request for an attorney."' The Court stated that the request must be sufficiently clear that
a reasonable law enforcement officer would understand the nature of the
request: "Ifthe suspect's statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning

84.
85.
86.
87.
under

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 473-74.
See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
102 F.3d 470 (11th Cir. 1996). This case also is discussed earlier in this Article
the heading Warrantless Searches/Exigent Circumstances.

88. Id. at 473.
89. Id. at 476.
90. Id. at 473.

91. Id. at 473-74.
92. Id,
93. Id. at 476. See Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1423-24 (11th Cir. 1994).
94.

512 U.S. 452 (1994).

95. Id.
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him."' The court of appeals subsequently applied the Davis holding
to cases involving equivocal requests to terminate questioning. 7
Applying the post-Davis rule to the facts of the case, the court of appeals
had no difficulty concluding that Mikell had not clearly invoked his right
to remain silent." The court held that "a suspect's refusal to answer
certain questions is not tantamount to the invocation, either equivocal
or unequivocal, of the constitutional right to remain silent and that
questioning may continue until the suspect articulates in some manner
that he wishes questioning to cease."" The Davis approach has an
analytical flaw when applied to the invocation of the right to remain
silent: certainly the refusal to respond to a particular question,
indicated by silence, gesture, or words, is a plain and unequivocal
invocation of the right to remain silent as to that question. However,
the approach is defensible insofar as it allows questioning to continue as
long as the arrestee indicates a willingness to continue the interview
and, perhaps, answer other questions. The investigators who interrogated Mikell made the analysis easier by explicitly telling Mikell that he
could choose to refuse to answer individual questions. 1"
Another recurring Fifth Amendment issue arose in United States v.
Holloway.' It is common for the possibly illegal conduct of persons
to be the subject of parallel civil and criminal proceedings by the federal
government. Because of the requirements of grand jury secrecy, the civil
and criminal proceedings are usually handled by separate government
attorneys. Holloway illustrates one of the pitfalls of parallel proceedings. Investigators executed a search warrant and found evidence of
drug and firearm violations by the Holloways. No arrests were made,
but a grand jury investigation was initiated into possible drug, firearm,
and tax violations. A civil forfeiture complaint also was filed against the
Holloways, alleging they had used their property to facilitate drug
transactions. Before criminal charges were filed, discovery in the civil
case proceeded. The Holloways, with their attorney, appeared for a
deposition as required. When the Holloways' attorney saw that a
criminal investigator was present, he threatened to leave with his
clients. The Assistant United States Attorney and the Holloways'
attorney stepped into the hallway and had a private conversation. When

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 462,
102 F.3d at 476. See Coleman, 30 F.2d at 1424.
102 F.3d'at 477.
Id.
Id. at 476.
74 F.3d 249 (11th Cir. 1996).
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the two attorneys returned, the deposition proceeded.'" ' When the
Holloways were indicted for criminal violations, they moved to dismiss
the charges, claiming that the attorney representing the government in
the civil forfeiture proceeding had assured them they would not be
prosecuted." 3 In essence, the Holloways claimed that the assurance
had the effect of a grant of immunity and that the subsequent use of the
civil discovery materials under the assurance was a violation of their
Fifth Amendment rights. The hearing in the district court was a
swearing contest. The government attorney said she made no such
assurance while the Holloways' attorney said she did.'1 4 The government pointed out that interrogatories served on the Holloways after the
deposition indicated that the Holloways' attorney expected an indictment, that the Holloways' attorney made no effort to document the
alleged promise, and that the motion to dismiss the charges was not
made for over fifteen months after indictment. Notwithstanding these
points, the district court credited the testimony of the Holloways'
attorney and dismissed the criminal prosecution."5 The court of
appeals reviewed the district court's factual findings for clear error and
affirmed.'" ' Obviously, the government failed to protect itself from
this claim. The government pointed out that the Holloways' attorney
had failed to document the promise, but it is equally true that the
government attorney did nothing to document a critical one-on-one
conversation with the defense lawyer. The presence of a witness, a
discussion of the understanding in the presence of others or on the
record in the deposition, or perhaps even a confirming letter after the
fact, would have helped the government convince the court. But those
steps were omitted, and the court doubted the credibility of the
government's civil attorney, who may have been suspected of covering up
a major goof.
Another noteworthy case concerning the right against self-incrimination is United States v. Moya.' ° In prior cases, the court of appeals
had held that "aliens at the border are entitled to Miranda warnings
before custodial interrogation."' 0 ' The question in Moya was whether
the definition of custody is different at a border crossing than other
places. When Moya arrived at Miami International Airport, he
presented a resident-alien card to an INS inspector. After a preliminary
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 249.
Id. at 250-51.
Id. at 251-52.
Id. at 253.
Id
74 F.3d 1117 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1119. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 914 (5th Cir. 1979).

1997]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1501

computer check indicated that Moya may have been deported previously,
a United States Immigration officer took Moya to an office and
interviewed him. The government offered statements made by Moya at
his trial for illegal re-entry into the United States following deportation.
Moya claimed that he was in custody and was not given Miranda
warnings. The district court denied Moya's motion to suppress the
statements on Fifth Amendment grounds.' °
The court of appeals reviewed the issue of custodial status as a mixed
question of fact and law."0 The objective test applied by the court
asked whether, under the totality of circumstances, a reasonable person
The
in Moya's position would feel that he was not free to leave.'
by
armed
accompanied
court noted that Moya was not handcuffed,
officers, or told he was not free to leave." 2 The record also reflected
that Moya never asked to leave or see an attorney."' Based on these
facts, the court held that Moya was not in custody and that no Miranda
warnings were necessary." 4 The court reasoned that the determination of whether Moya was in custody "should be interpreted in light of
the strong governmental interest in controlling the borders.""' At the
border, some degree of questioning is expected, the court stated, and it
must rise to "a distinctly accusatory level" before creating the feeling of
restraint that comes with arrest."6 The court concluded: "We stress
that events which might be enough often to signal 'custody' away from
enough to establish 'custody' in the context of
the border will not be 117
entry into the country."
B. Double Jeopardy
During the survey period, the court of appeals decided several
interesting cases involving the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. United States v. Stinson" concerned a case where a
bank robbery defendant was resentenced after successfully challenging
the calculation of his guideline sentence on appeal. At defendant's first
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

74 F.3d at 1118.
Id. at 1119.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1120.
Id.
97 F.3d 466 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1007 (1997).
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sentencing, the district court found that he was a "career offender."" 9
With the career offender enhancement, defendant's guideline range was
292-365 months imprisonment.m The prosecution asked the district
court to depart upward by two offense levels, which would have yielded
a range of imprisonment of 360 months to life. The district court denied
the government motion to depart, stating that a sentence at the top of
the applicable range (365 months) would be adequate to protect society;
however, the court noted that had the applicable range been lower, a
departure might have been appropriate.1"'
Stinson successfully challenged the career offender enhancement on
appeal. His case was remanded for resentencing. Without the career
offender enhancement, Stinson's guideline range was 210-262 months
imprisonment. However, this time the district court granted the
government's motion to depart upward. The court departed upward by
three levels, yielding a range of 292-365 months. After his successful
appeal, Stinson received the very same sentence.' 22 In the immortal
words of Yogi Berra, for Stinson it was "deja vu all over again." One
question faced by the court in Stinson's appeal following his second
sentencing was whether this deja vu was double jeopardy.
Stinson argued that the district court's upward departure at his
resentencing was improper. He invoked the Double Jeopardy Clause, as
well as the "law of the case doctrine," the Due Process Clause, and a
claim that the government had waived the right to move for departure
by failing to appeal the denial of its original motion to depart.' The
court of appeals rejected each of these contentions. 24 The court
declared that it had adopted a holistic approach to sentencing:
A criminal sentence is a package of sanctions that the district court
utilizes to effectuate its sentencing intent consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines .... Under this holistic approach, when a criminal
sentence is vacated, it becomes void in its entirety; the sentence-including "any enhancements-has been wholly nullified and
the slate wiped clean." Consequently, when a sentence is vacated and
the case is remanded for resentencing, the district court is free to
reconstruct the sentence utilizing any of the sentence components.m

119. 97 F.3d at 467.
120.
months
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 468. Defendant was also subject to a mandatory consecutive term of 60
for his conviction on one count of using a firearm during a crime of violence. Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 468-69.
Id. at 469, 470.
Id. at 469 (citations omitted).
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With respect to the double jeopardy argument, the court found that
Stinson voluntarily asked that the sentence be vacated and thereby
waived his right to raise a double jeopardy claim. 26 The court also
gave short shrift to Stinson's other arguments."2
There is a tension between the decision in Stinson and another
decision from the survey period, decided months earlier by another panel
of the Eleventh Circuit, United States v. Tamayo.'" Tamayo is not
cited or discussed in Stinson. In contrast to Stinson, a case in which the
government benefited from being able to revisit issues previously
litigated, in Tamayo it was the defendant who was arguing for reconsidTamayo's case was
eration of issues on remand for resentencing.'
remanded for resentencing because recent case law called into question
the validity of the calculation of Tamayo's criminal history score. 30
On remand, the district court decided that the recent case law did not
require a lower sentence. Tamayo asked the court to revisit other issues
that had been raised at the original sentencing, but the district court
declined to do so, noting that the mandate of the court of appeals on
remand was narrowly tailored to the criminal history issue. Indeed,
Tamayo was not formally given the right of allocution at his resentencing.1 The court of appeals affirmed. The key to the court's analysis
was the wording of the mandate on remand.'" The court held that
where the mandate is limited, the law of the case doctrine prevents
relitigation of issues."
Stinson and Tamayo can be reconciled: Stinson involved a mandate
that allowed all issues to be revisited while Tamayo involved an explicit,
limited mandate. The two cases, however, present the court and
attorneys with important systemic and strategic issues. Since the
advent of the Sentencing Guidelines, the courts of appeals have been
inundated with sentencing appeals. Errors often require a remand, if
only to decide where a defendant should be sentenced within the new
guideline range. From the standpoint of minimizing litigation, the use
126. Id.
127. Id. at 469-70.
128. 80 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1996).
129. Id. at 1515.
130. Id. at 1516-17.
131. Id. at 1518. The court noted that Tamayo conversed with the court at the time
of his resentencing, and stated that he had an opportunity to discuss concerns with the
court. Id, at 1518 n.4. However, the court stopped short of finding this amounted to
allocution and proceeded to decide the case assuming that the right of allocution was
denied. Id. at 1519.

132. Id. at 1518-21.
133. Id. at 1520.
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of limited mandates make sense. From the standpoint of the prosecution
and defense, limited mandates sometimes will benefit the prosecution (as
in Tamayo) and sometimes will benefit the defense (as a limited
mandate would have in Stinson). Practitioners will need to decide which
kind of mandate would advance their cause, develop arguments in favor
of the type of mandate they prefer, and explicitly seek that type of
mandate as part of the relief requested. The court of appeals will be
faced with weighing the efficiencies of limited mandates against the
values promoted by open mandates, such as the government's interest
in keeping Stinson off the street, or Tamayo's interest in presenting
himself as a changed person after part of his term. If the option of open
mandates is preserved despite the costs of revisiting issues, the
challenge will be to ensure that the benefits and risks of open mandates
are granted and imposed in a principled manner. What criteria should
determine whether the mandate is open or limited? This is the ultimate
issue raised in Stinson and Tamayo.
United States v. IsomM presents an intriguing double jeopardy
problem that the district court might have avoided. In jury selection for
a multi-defendant case expected to last several weeks, the court seated
twelve jurors and two alternates." In selecting the jury and alternates, the court exhausted the venire. 3 ' The court administered the
oath to the jurors, and jeopardy attached.'37 The court then sent the
jurors home for the weekend."3 Unfortunately, two of the regular
jurors had to be excused on Monday morning, which left the court
without any alternate jurors. The court ordered another venire for the
purpose of selecting alternate jurors and three were selected."'
During the trial, one of the members of the jury had to be excused, so
one of the three alternates was included on the jury that decided the
case. On appeal, the defense argued that they were entitled to be tried
by the jury that had been sworn before the weekend break and that the
subsequent addition of the alternate impermissibly altered the jury's
composition after the attachment of jeopardy."4 The court of appeals
pointed out that the defense did not move for a mistrial at the time the
court selected the alternates; instead, the defense contended that the
trial should proceed without the alternates. 4 The court also pointed
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

88 F.3d 920 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1325 (1997).
88 F.3d at 922.
Id.
Id. at 922, 924 n.8.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 922-23.
Id, at 923 n.7.
Id. at 923.
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out that at the time the regular juror was excused, the defense opted to
seat the alternate juror from the second venire rather than agree to a
jury of less than twelve as allowed by the federal procedure rules.' 4
Under these circumstances, the court held that no double jeopardy
violation occurred. 1"
This result is open to question. The court pointed to the defense's
failure to seek a mistrial when the court selected new alternates, but the
defense had no obligation to do so. The defense asked to go forward with
the twelve sworn jurors. The court also focused on the defense's failure
to agree to go forward with a jury of less than twelve, but the defense
was not obligated to agree under the federal rules.'" The defense
refusal to stipulate to a jury of fewer than twelve forced the district
court to seat one of the alternates, but surely the defense did not waive
the objection to using one of the alternates from the second venire. In
short, the defense claim seems to have merit: By adding the alternate
from the second venire, the court changed the composition of the jury
after the attachment of jeopardy. The court might have avoided the
problem. One approach would have been not to swear the jury until the
morning of trial. If the court believed three alternates were a good idea,
it could have delayed swearing the jury, ordered another venire, and
selected one or more additional alternates. Another tack would have
been to ask the defense to agree to a jury of less than twelve in the
event that one or more of the remaining twelve had to be excused. 45
If the defense refused to so agree, then the court could have declared a
mistrial, citing the need for alternate jurors as providing manifest
necessity. The defense would be hard pressed to argue that a court in
that situation must go forward without alternates and wait until the
high likelihood of losing a juror is realized. Of course, declaring a
mistrial would require starting jury selection from scratch, which is not
an appealing alternative. But even though Isom appears to countenance

142. Id. at 924. Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 23(b) states:
Juries shall be of 12 but at any time before verdict the parties may stipulate in
writing with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist of any number
less than 12 or that a valid verdict may be returned by a jury of less than 12
should the court find it necessary to excuse one or more jurors for any just cause
after trial commences. Even absent such stipulation, if the court finds it
necessary to excuse a juror for just cause after the jury has retired to consider its
verdict, in the discretion of the court a valid verdict may be returned by the
remaining 11 jurors.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b).
143. 88 F.3d at 924.
144. See FED. R. Caim. P. 23(b), supra note 142.
145. Id.
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the course of adding a new alternate to an already sworn jury, it is hard
to see how that course comports with the well-established double
jeopardy principle that the composition of the jury cannot be altered
after the attachment of jeopardy. And the stakes are high: if the court
of appeals finds a double jeopardy violation, reprosecution of the
defendant would be barred.
The court of appeals confronted another interesting double jeopardy
issue in United States v. Shenberg," a case arising out of the Dade
County, Florida, court corruption investigation known as "Operation
Court Broom." The charges included Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act ("RICO") conspiracy, substantive RICO violations, and
charges based on the crimes charged as the predicate acts constituting
the pattern of racketeering activity." Defendants were charged with
conspiring to operate, and operating, the Dade County Circuit Court
system through a pattern of racketeering activity, namely assorted acts
of extortion, money laundering, and mail fraud.' 4 The verdicts were
mixed. As to each defendant, the jury acquitted on some of the counts
charging individual acts of extortion, money laundering, and mail fraud.
As to several defendants, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the
RICO conspiracy charge, or the substantive RICO charge, or both.
Ultimately, the government elected to seek a retrial against defendant
Sepe, who had not been convicted on any counts. Sepe was acquitted on
a number of extortion, money laundering, and mail fraud charges, but
the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the RICO conspiracy,
substantive RICO, and a handful of extortion charges'."'
In anticipation of the retrial, the district court issued two rulings
grounded in the Double Jeopardy Clause. The government objected to
both rulings and cross-appealed on each. The first ruling was that
collateral estoppel barred the government from using crimes alleged in
counts of acquittal as predicate acts in the substantive RICO counts. It
is standard for the government to allege the particular crimes constituting the pattern of racketeering activity in the substantive RICO count
and also to have separate counts alleging the separate criminal
violations. The government argued that the acquittal on the individual
violations should not bar the government from alleging those same
violations as predicate acts for the substantive RICO count. The

146. 89 F.3d 1461 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 961 (1997).
147. 89 F.3d at 1468-69. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (RICO conspiracy); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(a) (1994) (substantive RICO violation); 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994) (describing
racketeering acts constituting pattern of racketeering activity).
148. 89 F.3d at 1469.
149. Id, at 1468-69, 1478.

1997]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1507

government reasoned that estoppel is a creature of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, and, therefore, the protections of collateral estoppel should be coextensive with the double jeopardy protections. The Double Jeopardy
Clause does not forbid a retrial after a mistrial; the retrial is said to be
"continuing jeopardy." Therefore, the acquittal on the individual counts
alleging extortion, money laundering, and mail fraud should not preclude
the use of those violations as predicate acts in the retrial of the RICO
count, which was a continuation of the original jeopardy. In essence, the
government argued that if double jeopardy is not implicated, then
collateral estoppel cannot be implicated."W
The court of appeals rejected the government's argument, holding that
"the Double Jeopardy Clause does not limit the application of collateral
estoppel to only cases in which double jeopardy applies." 15' The court
noted that "[tihe doctrine of collateral estoppel applies 'when an issue of
ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgement.'" 5 2 In the case of Sepe's retrial, the jury had rendered acquittals on the very charges that the government wanted to use as predicate
acts in the retrial.'" Indeed, the court stated that it would be appropriate to bar use of those predicate acts on a theory of direct estoppel,
because the government was seeking to relitigate an issue after a
The court drew support for its
judgment in the very same case.'
holding from a Seventh Circuit decision in an almost idefitical case
involving a mistrial on RICO charges in which the government sought
to use acquitted charges as predicate acts. 155 The court of appeals
seems to have reached the right result.'"
The second double jeopardy ruling of the district court was that
collateral estoppel also barred the use of the evidence concerning the
acquitted counts as proof of the RICO conspiracy.'57 The government
appealed this ruling as well, arguing that even if it were precluded from

150. Id. at 1478-79.
151. Id. at 1479.
152. Id. (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)).
153. It should be noted that there often are no special verdicts rendered on the various
predicate acts alleged in the substantive RICO count. The Shenberg opinion does not
indicate that any special verdicts were part of the record, and there was no separate jury
verdict explicitly rejecting the predicate acts listed in the substantive RICO count.
154. 89 F.3d at 1478.
155. Id. at 1479. See United States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270 (7th Cir. 1992).
156. In reaching this conclusion, the author feels obligated to note that he was one of
the government attorneys who, in Bailin, supranote 155, unsuccessfully advanced the very
argument made by the government in Shenberg. Perhaps my current view can be
attributed to several years' opportunity for reflection.
157. 89 F.3d at 1478.
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utilizing the acquitted counts as predicate acts, it should be allowed to
use the evidence of those acts as proof of the conspiracy. The government based its argument on the principle that collateral estoppel does
not bar the government from offering evidence of a crime for which the
defendant was acquitted. M The government cited Dowling v. United
States,'59 in which the Supreme Court allowed the admission as "other
act" evidence proof of a bank robbery for which defendant had been
The court of appeals agreed with the government's
acquitted."4
this
score and held that "the doctrine of collateral estoppel
position on
does not bar the government from using predicate acts that mirror
acquitted substantive offenses to prove RICO conspiracy."' 1 The court
also declared that one of its prior opinions, which held the opposite, was
no longer good law in light of Dowling."'e Once again, this seems the
right result.
Much double jeopardy litigation arises in the context of drug prosecutions involving criminal activity touching several federal jurisdictions.
The arsenal of the federal prosecutor includes venue rules that allow
prosecution in one federal district of a far-flung criminal enterprise as
long as part of the conspiracy touched the district of the prosecution.
When more than one federal prosecutor goes after the same multidistrict criminal enterprise, prosecutions can overlap and double
jeopardy 'issues can arise. 1" One such case was United States v.
M
In 1990, Harvey pleaded guilty to drug charges in federal
Harvey.'"
court in the Eastern District of Michigan. Harvey pleaded guilty to
violating the federal narcotics conspiracy statute by conspiring to possess
The charges alleged that one of the overt
and distribute cocaine."
acts committed was a 1986 importation of 487 kilograms of cocaine
through Sebastian Inlet, Florida."M Harvey was subsequently charged

158. Id. at 1480.
159. 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
160. Id. at 348-49.
161. 89 F.3d at 1481.
162. Id. at 1480 n.23. See United States v. Gornto, 792 F.2d 1028 (11th Cir. 1986).
163. See, eg., United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 380 (1992) (holding that a
subsequent prosecution for conspiracy to manufacture, possess, and distribute methamphetamine was not barred by a previous conviction in another district for attempt to
manufacture the same substance on the ground that a prosecution for conspiracy is not
precluded by a prior prosecution for the substantive offense).
164. 78 F.3d 501 (11th Cir. 1996).
165. Id. at 502. See 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994).
166. 78 F.3d at 502. The importation through Sebastian Inlet was described in the
Michigan charge as an "overt act." Id. Some conspiracy statutes contain an element of an
overt act, that is, some act in furtherance of the criminal agreement. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (1994). However, 21 U.S.C. § 846 contains no express overt act requirement. In
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in the Middle District of Florida with conspiracy to distribute cocaine
and with engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. The conspiracy
charge alleged the Sebastian Inlet importation as the overt act. The
government apparently saw the double jeopardy problem, but not all of
it. The government moved to dismiss the conspiracy charge, but pursued
the continuing criminal enterprise ("CCE") charge, which alleged the
Sebastian Inlet incident as one of the drug felonies committed by the
enterprise." The CCE crime is engaging in a series of drug felonies
for profit in concert with five or more other persons with respect to
The double
whom the defendant is a manager or supervisor.'"
jeopardy issue before the court of appeals was whether a CCE prosecution "may incorporate the same agreement and the same conduct" for
which Harvey had been convicted of conspiracy." The court had little
difficulty concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the
government from using the Sebastian Inlet importation conspiracy to
170
prove the "in concert" element of the subsequent CCE charge.
Noting that conspiracy has been held to be a lesser included offense of
the CCE crime, the court sought to determine whether the Michigan
conspiracy and Florida CCE merely overlapped or whether the two were
the same."' The court found that the two were the same, relying
heavily on the fact that the two charging instruments clearly allege the
The
Sebastian Inlet importation as the essence of the offense.'
court's conclusion is sound.
The Double Jeopardy Clause allows retrial following a mistrial if there
is "manifest necessity" for declaring the mistrial.1 73 Before declaring
a mistrial it is incumbent on the trial judge to consider alternatives, but
the findings do not have to be explicit.7 4 In Venson u. Georgia,75
the court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of habeas corpus
relief on the ground that defendant's retrial following a mistrial violated
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Defendant was charged with three counts
of sexual battery, with each count based on the testimony of a different
complaining witness. During defendant's first trial, the judge ruled that

1994, the Supreme Court held that section 846 does not require an allegation or proof of
an overt act. United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994).
167. 78 F.3d at 503. See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994).
168. See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994).
169. Harvey, 78 F.3d at 503.
170. Id. at 504-06.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 506.
173. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
174. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
175. 74 F.3d 1140 (11th Cir. 1996).

1510

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

the defense attorney had engaged in an improper attack on the
credibility of the complaining witness for Count Three. The State moved
for a mistrial, arguing that a curative instruction would be inadequate.1 7 The court agreed there were grounds for a mistrial and
granted a mistrial as to all three counts. The defense argued that there
had been no manifest necessity for mistrial on Counts One and Two and
that retrial of those counts should be barred. The trial court rejected the
argument. At defendant's second trial, he was convicted of Count One
and acquitted of the other two charges. The Georgia courts rejected
defendant's double jeopardy claim, but the United States District Court
granted defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State of
" ' The court of appeals held that the trial court's
Georgia appealed.17
178
declaration of a mistrial as to Count One was an abuse of discretion.
Although the record of the trial court's reasoning was somewhat sketchy,
the court chose not to remand the case."' The key factor supporting
the abuse of discretion finding was that the conduct provoking the
mistrial resulted in minimal prejudice to the State as to Count One."e
The Venson decision provides an important lesson for evaluating the
propriety of a mistrial in cases involving charges based on a series of
separate incidents. The manifest necessity finding must justify the
mistrial of each count.
1 involved double jeopardy and the related
United States v. Rivera""
doctrines concerning duplicitous and multiplicitous charging instruments. An indictment is duplicitous when more than one crime is
charged in a single count. Duplicity can be cured by instructing the jury
to consider each sub-crime separately and that unanimity is required to
convict for each sub-crime. Duplicitous charging actually favors the
defendant in one sense: The government could have charged multiple
counts, subjecting defendant to additional potential punishment.
Duplicity can also be cured by making the government elect the offense
on which it will proceed. Multiplicity occurs when a single crime is
charged in more than one count, subjecting the defendant to possible
multiple punishments.8 2
The defendant in Rivera was charged in a single count with being a
felon in possession of a firearm. The indictment charged that he

176. Id. at 1142-43.
177, Id. at 1144.
178. Id at 1147.

179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 77 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2511 (1996).
182. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.3(c) (2d
ed. 1992).
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possessed a certain firearm "'[o]n or about August 12, 1994 and
February 5, 1995.'""" The government's proof suggested possession on
August 12, 1994, February 5, 1995, and at various points in between.
At trial, the judge treated the charge as if it were duplicitous, using a
special verdict form dividing the count into two sub-crimes. The judge
instructed the jury that it could not convict unless there was unanimous
agreement that defendant possessed the gun on either or both August 12
and February 5. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the August
12 possession and acquitted defendant of the February 5 possession.
Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds.
The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.l'I
The analysis of the issue hinged on the nature of the crime of
possession. That crime can be continuous in nature, where an item is
possessed nonstop over a period of time. The crime can also be episodic,
with separate possessions of an item on separate occasions. Determining
whether possession is continuous or episodic is complicated because the
law recognizes the concepts of joint and constructive possession, which
require resort to notions like dominion and control to resolve issues of
possession. The court of appeals in Rivera addressed defendant's
contention that his possession was a continuing act and that the
acquittal should exonerate him of the entire charge. In answering this
claim, the court alluded to this rule: "Where there is no proof that
possession of the same weapon is interrupted, the Government may not
The court
arbitrarily carve a possession into separate offenses."'
by
violated
not
rule
was
that
the
acknowledged this rule, but concluded
as
a
firearm
of
a
of
possession
"Proof
had
done:
what the district court
is
possession
continuous
alleged
convicted felon on one day within an
On this same logic, the court
sufficient to support a conviction."'
not
bar a retrial because the jury's
did
estoppel
concluded that collateral
fact against the governultimate
issue
of
an
not
resolved
had
verdict
ment.'8 7 The court stated that the indictment was properly drawn to
allege a continuing offense of possession and that charging the two dates
of possession separately would have rendered the indictment multiplicitous.'88

The analysis of the court is flawed. First of all, the indictment did not
charge the crime of possession as a continuing offense. The indictment

183. 77 F.3d at 1350.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1351.
186.

Id.

187. Id. at 1352.

188. Id.
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charged the offense as occurring on August 12 and February 5. The use
of a conjunction does not create a charge of a continuing offense.
Ordinarily, a continuing offense would be indicated by language like
"from on or about August 12 to on or about September 5." If the crime
had been charged as a continuing offense, the jury would have been
instructed that it could convict if there was proof that defendant
possessed the gun at any point during that period. No special verdict
would have been needed. Given the result of the first trial, the jury
probably would have been unable to reach a general verdict on the
charge and there would have been no impediment to a retrial.
Instead, the district court instructed the jury as if it were voting on
two separate counts. It is not clear what possession instructions were
given by the district court, but it is clear that the court told the jury to
consider two charges on two discrete days.'" As the court of appeals
acknowledged, separate charges would have been multiplicitous because
the evidence established one continuous possession. Given the way the
indictment was drawn and the jury was instructed at the trial, the
verdict can be understood as an acquittal on one of two multiplicitous
counts. Such a verdict should preclude a retrial on double jeopardy
grounds. The issue is a tough one, but proper charging language
reflecting a continuing offense and corresponding jury instructions will
keep the issue from recurring.
C. Due Process
The courts have read a variety of procedural protections and rights
into the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court of
appeals decided several cases in 1996 arising under the clause. United
States v. Foxman'90 concerned a possible denial of due process because
of pre-indictment delay by the prosecution."
Usually, the statute of
limitations is viewed as providing the principal source of protection
against having to answer charges based on long-ago events."9 But the
Due Process clause has been held to require the dismissal of charges in
certain cases where the prosecution delays the filing of charges. Foxman
was a case in which the district court did exactly that.9 Defendant

189. Id. at 1350.
190. 87 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 1996).
191. Once an indictment or other charge is filed, pretrial delays are analyzed under the
speedy trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
192. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971).
193. Foxman, 87 F.3d at 1221.
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was charged with conspiracy involving the failure of a savings and loan.
The conduct occurred in 1983, and the indictment was returned in 1993,
within the statute of limitation for the charged offense.'" The district
court dismissed the indictment and the government appealed.'
The court of appeals noted that the standard of review is abuse of
discretion, but also noted that when the charge is brought within the
statute of limitations, the defendant bears a "heavy burden in showing
a dismissal is appropriate."'9 The court set forth the general test as
follows: "[Flor this dismissal to have been proper, Foxman must have
shown that pre-indictment delay caused him actual substantial prejudice
and that the delay was the product of a deliberate act by the government
designed to gain a tactical advantage.""9 Addressing the first prong
of this test, the court concluded that the district court was not clearly
erroneous in finding that Foxman had suffered actual substantial
prejudice from the delay: several witnesses critical to the defense had
died, and because Foxman was not put on notice of the investigation
until shortly before the indictment, he had no reason to preserve
evidence.8
The court of appeals then looked at the second prong of the test: the
delay must also be the "product of a deliberate act by the government
designed to gain a tactical advantage."'" Because the district court
had not addressed this prong, the court of appeals discussed the test and
remanded to the district court.2° The court of appeals made several
statements about how the district court might apply the test. Some of
the delay in the case occurred because the government waited until the
convictions of one defendant were affirmed before it immunized that
defendant. The court stated that delay from the decision over the timing
of the immunity grant is the sort of delay that might be viewed as
designed to achieve a tactical advantage. 2"' The court rejected the

194. I& See 18 U.S.C. § 3293 (1994) (10 year statute oflimitations for certain financial

institution offenses).
195. 87 F.3d at 1221.
196. I& at 1222.
197. Id. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971); United States v. Lovasco,
431 U.S. 783 (1977).

198. 87 F.3d at 1222-23.
199. Id. at 1223.
200. Id. at 1223-24. The district court had not analyzed the reasons for the delay
because it was under the impression that a recent Supreme Court case removed that step
in the analysis. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992). In Foxman, the Court
of Appeals held that Doggett, a Sixth Amendment case, does not alter the law under the
due process clause. Foxman, 87 F.3d at 1222.
201. 87 F.3d at 1222.
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notion that the government must be motivated by the desire to prejudice
the defense, such as where a prosecutor delays charges until a terminally ill defense witness dies.2m That sort of "bad faith" is not required.
The court explained:
The critical element is that the government makes a judgment about
how it can best proceed with litigation to gain an advantage over the
defendant and, as a result of that judgment, an indictment is delayed
.... The main point is showing acts done intentionally in pursuit of
a particular tactical advantage: delay (and the prejudice directly caused
by the delay) need not necessarily be the tactical advantage
sought.'
The court's opinion gives rise to two observations. First, although
courts have rarely dismissed indictments for pre-indictment delay, the
trend to longer statutes of limitations, such as the one at issue in
Foxman, may cause courts to scrutinize such claims more closely.' °
Second, the wisdom of the court's tactical advantage test is open to
question. By eschewing a conventional bad faith test requiring that the
government seek delay to cause prejudice, the court may be opening a
Pandora's Box. The court will have to engage in complicated second
guessing about the prosecutor's conduct of the investigation. This may
involve a hearing in which the court will examine prosecutors under
oath about their decisions and require the production of prosecution
documents. The second-guessing process will be tricky. Take the
example used by the court, the timing of a decision to immunize a
witness. Many factors may have caused the decision, such as the fear
that the witness would not be forthcoming until his convictions were
affirmed, or a fear of tainting the witness's reprosecution in case his
conviction was reversed, or a decision to wait in hopes that another
witness would come forward, obviating the need to immunize. The list
could go on. The court of appeals test will require after-the-fact policing
of the executive branch's prosecutorial decisions, a practice that the
Supreme Court has been reluctant to countenance.' 5

202. 1& at 1223 n.2.
203. Id.
204. See id. at 1224 n.4 (noting that dismissals are rare but expressing concern that

the long limitations period may not have protected the defendant).
205. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996) (announcing rigorous
standard for triggering discovery based on selective prosecution claims under the Due
Process Clause, citing the presumption of regularity of the executive's exercise of
prosecutorial discretion).
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Trial lawyers are familiar with the fact that some trial judges do not
like the lawyers to instruct the jury about the law-these judges view
the instructions on the law to be their province and they do not want the
lawyers usurping the function. Within limits, this attitude makes sense.
The lawyers should not be allowed to make misstatement of law or
confuse the legal issues. But if taken to an extreme, refusing to let the
lawyers discuss the law prevents them from effectively arguing their
cases and may deny the parties due process. That is what happened in
United States v. Hall.206 Hall was on trial on a charge of being a felon
in possession of a firearm. When Hall's attorney delivered -his closing
argument, he sought to address some of the legal matters that would
later be set forth in the court's jury instructions.' Hall's attorney was
repeatedly blocked by the court when he attempted to make reference to
the law. The court interrupted the attorney: "[Wihat I want you to do
is get to the facts and the evidence. You are usurping so far the role of
When the attorney tried to
the court. I will instruct the jury"2
apply the definition of reasonable doubt to his attack on the government's two key witnesses, the following exchange occurred:
Counsel: This ladies and gentlemen, is the case. It's the two people
that the government relies upon to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Mr. Hall participated in this offense. Now, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is proof of such a characterCourt: No, no, no.
Counsel: You will not allow that, Your Honor?
Court: No.
Counsel: I will pass. His Honor will instruct you on proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.. .. '
The court of appeals held that the closing argument of Hall's attorney
Hall's conviction was rehad been "impermissibly restricted." 1
versed. 1
Although the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
by its terms, applies only to the states, the Supreme Court has applied
equal protection guarantees to the federal government by finding a "due

206. 77 F.3d 398 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 139 (1996).
207. 77 F.3d at 400.

208. Id. at 400 n.1.
209. Id. at 400.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 401.
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process component" in the Fifth Amendment.2 1
Equal protection
analysis now plays an important role in the law ofjury selection. Under
Batson v. Kentucky"' and its progeny, both parties in a criminal
case21 4 may object to the other side's use of peremptory challenges on
the ground that the challenges are being used to strike jurors on an
impermissible basis, such as race, gender, or ethnicity.21
Under
Batson, if a party can make out a prima facie case that peremptory
challenges are being used for an impermissible purpose (usually based
on a pattern of strikes), then the burden shifts to the side making the
strike to provide a race or gender-neutral reason for the strike.21 If
the court finds a Batson violation, the usual penalty is that one or more
jurors against whom the challenges were exercised will be seated on the
jury.
In Wallace v. Morrison,217 the court of appeals announced a potentially important new rule to be applied during litigation over Batson
issues. In that decision, the court adopted the so-called "dual motivation
analysis."21 8 Under this analysis, the finding that race or gender was a
substantial part of the party's motivation for the strike would not end
the inquiry. Instead, the party found to have had an improper motive
may raise an "affirmative defense" by "showing by a preponderance of
the evidence that the strike would have been exercised in the absence of
any discriminatory motivation."219 The court approved the district
court's formulation of "the dispositive question in dual-motivation
analysis:
would the prosecutor have exercised each challenged
peremptory strike solely for his proffered race-neutral reasons?2 °
This analysis creates a new category of mixed motive cases that will
pass muster under Batson. The court of appeals has since stated that
"resort to dual motivation analysis will rarely be necessary"2
Despite this prediction, dual motivation analysis may well play a role,
at least as an alternative basis for decision. Thus, the court might find
that the race or gender-neutral reasons for the strike are sufficient, but
212. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
213.

476 U.S. 79 (1986).

214. See Georgia v. McCullom, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (prosecution may challenge strikes
of defendant).
215. See, eg., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1992) (Hispanics); J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (gender).
216. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.

217. 87 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 616 (1996).
218. 87 F.3d at 1274-75.
219. Id,
220. Id. at 1274.
221. United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1328 (1997).
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that even if race or gender were a partial motive, the party would have
made the strike for the permissible purpose. Combined with recent case
law concerning what constitutes a valid race or gender-neutral reason,
the dual motivation analysis may provide a device for defending against
Batson challenges at trial and on appeal.'

IV.

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.'

A.

The Right to Counsel

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right to effective
assistance of counsel. If the right did not require competent representation, it would become a paper tiger. The Supreme Court's test for
determining when counsel's performance falls below the requirements of
the Sixth Amendment is often criticized as failing to adequately ensure
the quality of representation. The current test requires a showing that
(1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's
unprofessional conduct, the result of the case would have been different.'
A "reasonable probability" of a different outcome means that
the chances are such that confidence in the outcome is undermined.'
In Huynh v. King,2' the court of appeals found that a defense
attorney in a murder case had failed to meet the first part of the
Strickland test when he failed to file a motion to suppress evidence in
a timely manner; when the motion was filed, the court dismissed it as
Crucial evidence linking defendant to the murder had
untimely.'

222. See Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct 1769, 1771 (1995) (per curiam) (a legitimate reason
need not make sense-it must be a reason that does not deny equal protection).
223. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
224. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).

225. Id. at 694.
226. 95 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 1996).
227. Id. at 1055.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

1518

(Vol. 48

been found during a pat-down search. However, there seemed to be a
strong argument that the scope of the pat-down search exceeded
allowable limits. Indeed, the evidence was discovered during a second
pat-down search, which followed another search that was limited to the
permissible purpose of searching for weapons.'
At a post-trial
hearing, Huynh's attorney explained his failure to ifie the motion in a
timely fashion. In essence, the attorney said he did so on purpose,
hoping that the refusal of the trial judge to hear the motion would
become an issue on appeal. Furthermore, the attorney stated his belief
that the suppression motion was meritorious." The court of appeals
concluded that the attorney's decision to file a possibly meritorious
suppression motion in an untimely manner was unacceptable.'
The
court quoted from the Supreme Court's decision in Kimmelman v.
w "' "No reasonable
Morrison:
lawyer would forgo competent litigation
of meritorious, possibly decisive issues on the remote chance that his
deliberate
dereliction might ultimately result in federal habeas
23 2
review."
Having found counsel's performance inadequate under the first part
of the Strickland test, the court decided to remand to the district court
for a thorough analysis of the merit of the motion to suppress.2 "
However, the court concluded that based on the critical nature of the
evidence recovered in the pat-down search, that had the evidence been
excluded, there would be a reasonable probability that the outcome
would have been different.'
Thus, the district court on remand was
to decide
whether
the
motion,
if timely filed, would have been grant25
ed. 8
There is an irony to the outcome in Huynh. The trial attorney said
that he failed to file the motion to create an appellate issue; he
specifically mentioned the possibility that the federal courts would be
concerned that the motion had not been heard. He also said he feared
that the state court would simply believe the police and his motion to
suppress would fail. 2" The court stated that "no competent lawyers
would choose deliberately to 'set up' an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim whereby that lawyer's own incompetence would serve as the cause

228. Id. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
229. 95 F.3d at 1056.

230.
231.
232.
233.

477 U.S. 365 (1986).
95 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986)).
477 U.S. at 383 n.7.
95 F.3d at 1058.

234. Id. at 1058 n.6.
235. Id. at 1058.
236. Id. at 1056-57.
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for defaulting a claim. 7 But it is apparent that defendant Huynh
may well be better off because of the strategic decision of his trial
counsel, a decision deemed to be incompetent. The decision also had the
effect of having the ultimate merit of the suppression motion decided by
a federal court.
The right to counsel is also fortified by the requirement that counsel
be given the opportunity to be present at every "critical stage" of
criminal proceedings. One such critical stage is a pretrial psychological
The court of appeals was confronted with an unusual
examination.'
problem concerning the right to counsel in this setting in Delguidice v.
Singletary. 9 Defendant was the subject of two separate state prosecutions. He was represented by different lawyers in the two cases. In
one case, he was convicted and set for sentencing. His family arranged
for a clinical psychiatrist, Dr. Ceros-Livingston, to determine defendant's
competency to be sentenced. In the second case, which was pending at
the time defendant was preparing for sentencing in the first case,
defendant was charged with attempted manslaughter and battery.' °
When Dr. Ceros-Livingston went to evaluate defendant before his
sentencing in the first case, she "was under the misapprehension that
she was to evaluate Delguidice with respect to both pending cases."
The lawyer handling the sentencing did not know the scope of the
doctor's examination and the lawyer handling the manslaughter and
battery case did not receive notice of the examination. 2 2
At the trial on the manslaughter and battery charges, defendant used
an insanity defense. An expert testified on defendant's behalf, and
opined that defendant was insane at the time of the alleged offenses.
The State responded by calling Dr. Ceros-Livingston, who testified that
defendant knew right from wrong and understood the consequences of
his actions. Dr. Ceros-Livingston was the only witness who testified
contrary to defendant's expert on the issue of insanity. Defendant was
convicted. The Florida courts affirmed. The United States District
Court denied defendant's request for habeas relief.2"
The court of appeals reversed and granted the writ of habeas
corpus. 2' The court stated: "In sum, the Sixth Amendment right to

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id at 1057.
See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
84 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1360-61.
Id. at 1361.
Id,
Id.
Id. at 1364.
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counsel requires that counsel be given, advance notice of the scope and
nature of a psychological examination so that counsel can discuss with
the client the advisability of undergoing the examination and give other
appropriate advice."'
The purpose of the notice requirement is to
give counsel a chance to act before and during the examination.'
The
court addressed the State's contention that the lawyer representing
defendant in the sentencing received notice and was present at the
examination to protect defendant's rights. The court rejected this
argument because the lawyer representing defendant in the sentencing
was unaware that the scope of the examination included the other
criminal case.2' 7 The court concluded that defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated and that the error was not harmless.'
Another principle that augments the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is the notion that one has a right to counsel of one's own
choosing.' 9 United States v. McCutcheon2 ° concerned the limits on
this Sixth Amendment "right to choose." McCutcheon and a codefendant, Samuels, were set for trial on drug charges. McCutcheon's
lawyer indicated that McCutcheon would be using an entrapment
defense that would incriminate Samuels. In response, Samuels stated
that he would testify and contradict McCutcheon's defense. That
decision further complicated matters because McCutcheon's chosen
counsel had represented Samuels in a prior case and had learned
personal information about Samuels in their privileged discussions.
Because Samuels would not waive the privilege, McCutcheon's attorney
was in a conflict of interest between representing his current client and
loyalty to his former client. One solution, requested by Samuels, was to
sever the trials of the two defendants. The district court, however,
refused to do that. Instead, the court disqualified McCutcheon's lawyer
because of the conflict of interest. McCutcheon retained a new lawyer,
but as it turned out, defendants' trials were severed for scheduling
reasons. McCutcheon was convicted and appealed, arguing that the
court had needlessly denied his choice of counsel.5 1
The court of appeals began its analysis by stating that "while the right
to counsel is absolute, there is no absolute right to counsel of one's own
choice." 252 The court pointed out that precedent holds "that the right

245.

Id. at 1362 (citations omitted).

246. Id at 1362 n.7.

247. Id. at 1362.
248. Id. at 1364.
249.
250.
251.
252.

See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
86 F.3d 187 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 188-89.
Id. at 189.
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to a choice of counsel is subordinate to the requirements of the efficient
With that foundation, the
and orderly administration of justice."2
finding that McCutcheon's
court's
district
the
court went on to approve
2
McCutcheon offered to
'
Although
lawyer had a conflict of interest.
refusal to waive the
Samuels'
that
found
waive the conflict, the court
conflict left Samuels' interests open to damage. 2" The court went on
to consider McCutcheon's claim that the judge should have eliminated
the conflict by severing the trials, especially in light of the fact that the
cases were eventually severed for other reasons. 2 " The court conceded
that "subsequent events might indicate it would have been the better
part of discretion to grant a severance." 7 However, in deciding
whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for
severance, the court of appeals looked at the situation as it existed at
the time of district court's ruling."6 From that perspective, the court
viewed the district court's ruling as a reasonable exercise of its "broad
In any event, McCutcheon
discretion" to "manage its own docket.'
did receive a separate trial, and there was no showing that the court's
exercise of discretion caused him compelling prejudice. 2'
B.

The Right to Speedy Trial

In the federal system, most litigation over the right to a speedy trial
focuses on the Speedy Trial Act,2 ' the statutory scheme enacted by
Congress. In most cases, the statutory scheme has supplanted the Sixth
Amendments speedy trial guarantee as the primary legal basis for
challenging delay. Indeed, the Speedy Trial Act was designed to fill a
void left by the Supreme Court's reluctance to read any strict time limits
However, some defendants do invoke
into the Sixth Amendment.'
the Sixth Amendment's right of speedy trial in certain situations. The
court of appeals decided two noteworthy Sixth Amendment speedy trial
cases in 1996. The first was United States v. Derose.2' Defendants

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 190.
Id.
Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3161-3174 (1994).

262. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

263. 74 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 1996).
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Derose and Ould were arrested in July 1991 and charged in a criminal
complaint with conspiring to purchase marijuana.2
A preliminary
hearing was held and the court found probable cause.' Although the
Speedy Trial Act requires that an indictment be returned within thirty
days of an arrest,' the government did not obtain an indictment in
a timely manner and did not even move to dismiss the pending criminal
complaint until July 1993, a year after the arrest.'
In May 1993, the
government finally obtained an indictment charging the defendants with
conspiracy (as in the complaint) and possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute.2
Defendants argued that the indictment should be dismissed because
the dismissal of the complaint should have been with prejudice.'
Under the Speedy Trial Act, the court is allowed to dismiss a complaint
with prejudice in certain cases.2 ' 0 The district court found that this
was an appropriate case to dismiss with prejudice: the one year delay
between arrest and the dismissal of the complaint was due to "gross
negligence" by the prosecutor."'
However, the dismissal of the
complaint with prejudice did not end the prosecution because the
complaint had only contained the conspiracy charge. The dismissal of
the complaint with prejudice precluded the prosecution on the conspiracy
charge, but not the possession count of the indictment." 2 Defendants
advanced two arguments contending that the possession charge should
also be precluded. One argument was statutory, the other constitutional.
The statutory argument was that the possession charge was supported
by the same facts as the dismissed conspiracy charge; the possession

264. Id. at 1150-51.
265. Id. at 1180.

266. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (1994). Extensions can be obtained with leave of court,
but there is no indication that occurred in the case in question. Id.
267. 74 F.3d at 1180.
268. I&
269. Id.
270. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1) (1994).
271. 74 F.3d at 1180. It is important to put the negligence of the prosecutor in
perspective. Had the prosecutor moved to dismiss the complaint within the 30 day period
for returning an indictment, the complaint almost certainly would have been dismissed
without prejudice. Once the complaint is dismissed, the defendants are not formally
charged with a crime, and the limitations of the Speedy Trial Act do not apply. In the
author's experience, it not uncommon for complaints to be dismissed and for lengthy
periods of time to pass before indictment. Thus the negligence of the prosecutor in Derose
was the failure to dismiss the complaint in a timely fashion, which is a routine act that
removes the case from the strictures of the Speedy Trial Act.
272. Id. at 1180-81.
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charge merely "gilded" the conspiracy charge."' Under these circumstances, defendants argued, the possession charge should be precluded
The
where the conspiracy charge was dismissed with prejudice.'
court rejected this argument. The principal basis for the court's holding
was that the possession charge is not merely a gilding of the conspiracy
charge.'
The court noted that conspiracies and substantive offenses
are distinct crimes and even questioned whether a "substantive offense
Although the court did not
can ever gild a conspiracy charge."'
decide the issue, it also called into question the viability of the so-called
"gilding exception" to the Speedy Trial Act in the Eleventh Circuit,
pointing to some conflicting language in the cases.277
Defendants' constitutional argument was that once accused in the
complaint in July 1991, their Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights
attached and their trial on the possession charge in January 1994 was
not a speedy trial. 8 Given its view that conspiracy and possession
are distinct offenses, the court had little difficulty in disposing of
defendants' claim. Because the July 1991 complaint charged only
conspiracy, it was irrelevant. Because possession charge was not lodged
until May 1993, the delay from charging to trial was only eight months,
an insufficient time to merit a speedy trial inquiry.7 9
United States v. Clark') addressed another constitutional speedy
trial claim generated by a government foul-up. In July 1993, Clark was
arrested by police in Alabama on drug charges. The state case was
dismissed and the matter was presented to the United States Attorney
for prosecution. An indictment was returned against Clark in September 1993, but Clark was not arrested for seventeen months. Clark did
not know about the charges until his arrest and did nothing to avoid
arrest. It was undisputed that Clark would have been easy to find-the
failure to arrest him was simply the result of negligence. Clark's case
had "fallen through the cracks." 1 On these facts the district court
found that Clark's Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights were violated.
The indictment was dismissed with prejudice.2 2

273. Id. at 1183-84,
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1184.
277. Id
278. Id. at 1184-85.
279. Id. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (delay of approximately one
year is needed to trigger inquiry).
280. 83 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1996).
281. Id. at 1352-53.
282. Id. at 1351.
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The court of appeals applied the factors set forth in the Supreme
Court's decision in Barker v. Wingo:'s (1) the length of the delay; (2)
the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted the right to
speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to defendant.'
The court also
noted the Supreme Court opinion in Doggett v. United States,2" which
stated that a speedy trial inquiry is triggered in the pre-indictment
setting only when the defendant shows that the length of delay was
"presumptively prejudicial."2 Applying these standards, the court of
appeals first found that the seventeen-month delay was sufficient to
trigger an inquiry under Doggett."7 Thus the threshold requirement
was met and the first Barker factor was noted for purposes of applying
the test. As for the second factor, the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's finding that the delay was caused by the government's
negligence.'
The third factor, which concerns the defendant's
assertion of the right, did not weigh against defendant's claim because
he did not know about the indictment.8 9
The difficult portion of the court's analysis concerned the prejudice to
the defendant, the fourth Barker factor. In cases of government bad
faith or negligence, the presumption of prejudice may compel relief even
when the defendant fails to show particularized prejudice.'
And the
concern over prejudice increases in proportion to the delay. 91 The
court of appeals compared Clark's case to the facts of Doggett, a case in
which the court found prejudice from an eight and one-half year
delay.'
The court also noted appellate decisions finding insufficient
prejudice based on delays similar to the delay in Clark's case. 2 With
these precedents suggesting that the presumption of prejudice would
carry the day for Clark, the court went on to find that Clark's showing
of actual prejudice was too weak to require relief.2N Clark was not
subject to incarceration during the delay, nor did he suffer added

283. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
284. 83 F.3d at 1352.
285.

505 U.S. 647 (1992).

286. 83 F.3d at 1352.
287. Id.

288. Id. at 1352-53.
289. Id. at 1353.
290. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657-58.
291. Id. at 657.
292. 83 F.3d at 1353-54. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655, 657-58; Robinson v. Whitley, 2
F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1167 (1994); United States v. Beamon, 992
F.2d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir. 1993).
293. 83 F.3d at 1353-54.
294. Id. at 1354.
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anxiety, as he did not know about the charges.' Furthermore, Clark
was unable to demonstrate that his defense had been impaired by the
passage of time.'
Weighing all of the Barker factors, the court of
appeals concluded that Clark was not denied his Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial.'
The outcome in Clark is representative of the
reluctance of courts to derail criminal prosecutions delayed by government blunders, unless the showing of prejudice is strong or the length
of the delay is so outrageous that prejudice is assumed.

295. Id
296. Id.
297. Id.

